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the profession. With the sick person as the major concern, no professional has the 
option of avoiding the religious dimension of that person. 
One other point can be made about the kind of religion or ethics to be taught. 
If the ethics treated is strictly philosophical, it is not sufficient for religious 
believers. For them, the theology of suffering is a means of grace, of reconcilia-
tion. A naturalistic ethics falls far short of this meaning and scarcely touches on 
the fact of suffering. We might conclude with a quote of Dr. Edmund Pellegrino, 
former president of the Catholic University of America: 
What are the du ties imposed on us by virtue of the volunteer act we take as 
professional healers? It's high time we disclose to the public what we stand 
for (Denver Catholic Register, Sept. 9, 1981, p. 3). 
- F. J. Malecek, S.J. 
Bellarmine House of Studies, St. Louis, Mo. 
Ethics and Regulation 0/ Clinical Research 
Robert J. Levine 
Urban & Schwarzenberg, Baltimore, 1981, xvii + 299 pp. 
This book is filled with minor mistakes and glaring deficiencies. The title of the 
work seems to need a definite article somewhere. The book begins with a 
misspelled nominalist quote: "Entia /lon su/lt multiplicanda prater [sic] necessi-
tatem. "The most quoted source in the work is the author himself. 
The work appears to be a summary and critique of the DHEW and DHHS 
regulations of clinical research on human subjects. As a summary it is helpful , but 
as a critique, it is quite weak. The weakness stems from the author's superficial 
grasp of the ethical principles which ground the federal regulations. The brief 
discussions of the principles of justice, beneficence and respect of persons indi-
cates that the author does not understand a great deal of moral philosophy, and 
this is borne out in the criticisms the author makes. Not only is Levine 's under-
standing of these principles inadequate, but his understanding of consent, human 
acts, conscience and human goods is also faulty. He argues that informed consent 
is gained through a process of negotiation between the researcher and the client. 
This view implies an adversary relationship, rather than one in which cooperation 
is the keynote. In the researcher-client relationship, the client offers consent in 
order to promote goods and values for the community without violating values of 
his own health and well-being. The researcher promotes these values through his 
work, while also acting to limit any harm to the client, and compensating the 
client for any harm that comes about through the experim ent. Informed consent 
is not "negotiated" into being, as much as it is brought about by the client 
understanding the facts of the situation and intuiting or apprehending the values 
involved in it. 
Levine approves of non-therapeutic experimentation on children, the mentally 
infirm and fetuses within certain limits, on account of his inadequate understanding 
of the relationship of acts of conscience to acts promoting one's health and 
well-being. Decisions concerning one's health are moral decisions in that one is 
determining how to promote the moral value of one's physical health and well-




being. As such, they are prudential judgments of conscience, and for them to be 
attributable to the agent, the conditions required to satisfy an ordinary judgment 
of conscience are applicable here. At it is not ethically permissible to impose the 
harms of war on a conscientious objector, so also is it not permissible to impose 
harms involved in research on patients who object to them. As a society cannot 
demand of children that they agree to risk harms for the good of society, so also 
medical research cannot demand of children that they risk harms for the purpose 
of advancing medical knowledge. This is so because children lack the conceptual 
wherewithal to formulate responsible prudential judgments of conscience. And 
what applies to children applies even more forcefully to the unborn. The duty to 
receive informed consent is grounded only generically on the principle of respect 
of persons, for its specific foundation is the principle that decisions concerning 
one's health and physical well·being must be made by someone - either the 
person himself or one charged with the care of the person - who is capable of 
making this type of judgment. 
The author makes the very fine point that all arrangements between the 
researcher and client should include the stipulation that compensation will be 
provided to the client for any harms whatsoever incurred on account of the 
research, irrespective of the liabilities of the researcher. 
This work was written with the express purpose of modifying and streamlining 
regulations and procedures employed by Institutional Review Boards. It is 
unlikely that the modifications suggested by the author would be as cost·effective 
as he suggests, and in all probability the modified procedures would be less 
ethically acceptable than the ones presently in use. 
This book is of value for the summary and review of current DHEW and DHHS 
regulations, but it is seriously deficient as an ethical critique of these policies and 
regulations. 
- Robert L. Barry, O.P. 
New Religions and Mental Health: 
Understanding the Issues 
Herbert Richardson, Editor 
Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, N. Y. 14092, LII + 172 pp. 
In the book New Religions and Mental Health, Herbert Richardson has brought 
together in a single volume a series of articles wh ich delineate the salient issues of 
what, for some, seems to be a modern, perplexing problem - the conversion of 
many of our intelligent young people to forms of religious belief and practice 
which are perceived as new and inimical to established religious beliefs and prac· 
tice and even to the good of society itself. The editor selects articles by authors 
who present a wide variety of viewpoints on this controversial issue and integrates 
them into a manageable whole , through an introduction which summarizes the 
issues raised in the articles . 
The first set of articles is used to define the problem by presenting a case 
against the cults and then showing what is involved in the process of "deprogram' 
ming." A discussion of "mental health" as a social weapon and various proposals 
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